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TRUST(EE) AND ABANDONMENT ISSUES: A PROPOSAL
FOR NEW ACTION REGARDING ABANDONMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTALLY CONTAMINATED PROPERTY
ABSTRACT
Section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code permits trustee abandonment of
property that is “burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value
and benefit to the estate.” Environmentally contaminated property is certainly
burdensome to the estate due to the exorbitant costs associated with
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”) cleanups, and paying for these cleanups out of the estate may
render the property worth less than its initial value. Thus, the question
becomes: When is it proper for a chapter 7 trustee to abandon environmentally
contaminated property?
The one Supreme Court case on the matter, Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. did not give a clear answer to the question. The Court
held that abandonment was proper if the contamination did not pose an
immediate and identifiable threat to public health. Because this guidance is
ambiguous, courts are at a loss for how to rule when these cases are
presented, implementing their own rules for determining when abandonment is
proper. As a result, the situation is a mess; however, there are a few possible
solutions.
This Comment explores four potential solutions to this problem: 1) a
bankruptcy trustee can assert the “innocent landowner defense” under
CERCLA, maintaining title while not paying for the cleanup; 2) an amendment
to CERCLA or the Bankruptcy Code that gives federal and state governments a
“superlien” for recovery of proceeds used in environmental cleanups; 3) an
amendment to § 554 of the Bankruptcy Code that establishes an “abandonment
test” for determining when abandonment of environmentally contaminated
property is proper; and 4) a potential balancing test courts could use to
determine when abandonment of environmentally contaminated property is
proper.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a situation in which you are appointed trustee in a chapter 7
liquidation of a business. Early on, you learn that the property is not in
compliance with state environmental laws. Bringing the property into
compliance may be incredibly expensive, possibly resulting in a minimal
payment to creditors and yourself. Conversely, you can attempt to abandon the
property under § 554(a), revesting the deed to the property and the cleanup
liability to the debtor.1 Because the rules regarding abandonment are different
in different circuits2, it is necessary to explore other potential options.
In bankruptcy, abandonment is the process of a trustee removing property
from a chapter 7 estate, effectively returning title to the bankrupt party.3
Unfortunately, statutes and courts alike have been vague regarding trustee
abandonment of environmentally contaminated property for nearly three
decades. While some cases have involved minor environmental contamination,
others have involved cleanups under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) that cost hundreds of
millions of dollars. Although the property will eventually be cleaned, the
primary issue is determining who will pay for these cleanups.
Because there is no hardline rule governing trustee abandonment of
environmentally contaminated property, this Comment proposes four
solutions: (1) applying the “innocent landowner defense” found in CERCLA4
to chapter 7 trustees in bankruptcy, which no trustee has ever asserted; (2)
amending the Bankruptcy Code or CERCLA to provide the government with a
“superlien” for cleanup costs;5 (3) amending the Bankruptcy Code to provide a
test similar to the means test6 that would aid in discerning when abandonment
of environmentally contaminated property is proper; and (4) creating a
1

11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2012).
See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, Co., 966 F.2d 837, 847 (4th Cir. 1992); In re FCX, Inc.,
96 B.R. 49, 54–55 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989); Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G. Hillinger, Environmental
Affairs in Bankruptcy: 2004, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 331, 368 (2004); see also W. Props. Serv. Corp. v.
Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3d 678, 691 (9th Cir. 2004); Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863,
875–77 (9th Cir. 2001). But see United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 707 (6th Cir. 2000); ABB
Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 357–58 (2d Cir. 1997); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. Koppers Co.,
40 F.3d 750, 761 (5th Cir. 1994).
3 See 11 U.S.C. § 554.
4 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3)
(2012).
5 Id.
6 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A).
2
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balancing test for courts to use rather than the arbitrary and vague standard laid
out by the Supreme Court in 1986.7
I. BACKGROUND
To argue for alternative solutions to abandonment based upon
environmental grounds, it is pertinent to understand several facets of the law.
This background section discusses the following: CERCLA, § 554 of the
Bankruptcy Code, Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection,8 subsequent inconsistent interpretations of
Midlantic, the innocent landowner defense as an affirmative defense to
CERCLA, and the secured creditors exemption under CERCLA.
A. CERCLA
CERCLA provides a mechanism for cleaning up environmentally
contaminated property. The Act sets environmental laws and gives the EPA the
authority to issue regulations that “protect public health and the environment
by facilitating the cleanup of environmental contamination and imposing costs
on the parties responsible for the pollution.”9 Congress wanted to establish
laws that determined liability and created a system that provided funding for
cleanup.10 CERCLA creates a complicated scheme11 that ultimately “promotes
the ‘private allocation of responsibility’ for costs incurred in responding to
threatened or actual releases, spills, or discharges of hazardous substances12 at
existing or abandoned sites.”13 Once an agency determines that a site has been
7

See Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 507 n.9 (1986).
Id.
9 CMC Heartland Partners v. Union Pac. R.R. (In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co.), 3 F.3d
200, 201 (7th Cir. 1993); see Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 2, at 369.
10 See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OSWER
DIRECTIVE NO. 9833.0-1A, GUIDANCE ON CERCLA SECTION 106(A) UNILATERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
FOR REMEDIAL DESIGNS AND REMEDIAL ACTIONS (1990) [hereinafter EPA OSWER GUIDANCE] (“An
objective of Superfund enforcement is to place ultimate responsibility for the costs of cleaning up Superfund
sites on those who contributed to the problem.”).
11 See Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 45 BUS. LAW. 923, 924 (1990); Jill
Thompson Losch, Note, Bankruptcy v. Environmental Obligations: Clash of the Titans, 52 LA. L. REV. 137,
138 (1991).
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988), which references hazardous and toxic substances in the Clean Water
Act (33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b)(2)(A), 1317(a)), Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. § 6921), Clean Air Act (42
U.S.C. § 7412), Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. § 2606), and CERCLA (42 U.S.C. § 9602).
13 See Losch, Note, supra note 11, at 138–39 (citation omitted) (quoting Lewis M. Barr, supra note 11, at
1001).
8
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contaminated, CERCLA “lay[s] liability at the feet of a broadly defined
‘potentially responsible party.’”14 Additionally, the Act creates a governmental
response by authorizing “federal and state governments to clean up hazardous
waste sites and to undertake emergency responses to releases of hazardous
substances.”15 Although it is important for the polluter to pay, CERCLA’s
underlying purpose is to, protect the environment and public health by cleaning
up contamination.16
CERCLA developed a system to pay for cleanup for when either the
responsible parties were unable to pay or an emergency situation arose that
called immediate government action.17 Commonly known as the “Superfund,”
CERCLA created a trust “comprising revenues from taxes . . . to be used by
the federal and state governments to pay for site cleanups where the
responsible parties do not.”18 If the government pays for the cleanup of
hazardous materials, then it can legally sue the responsible parties for
reimbursement costs.19 This method of indemnification occurs frequently even
though the massive costs of cleanup may result in a lack of full
compensation.20
Responsible parties’ ability to indemnify the government becomes
understandably more limited when bankruptcy is involved. A party may be
unable to bear the brunt of such high cleanup costs.21 A CERCLA claim that is
brought by the EPA or another governmental agency for reimbursement of
cleanup costs incurred prepetition is dischargeable.22 Similarly, a cleanup order
that has been converted into an obligation to pay money is also
14

Id. at 139.
1 COLLIER REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE ¶ 6.07[1] (2015) (explaining
the basic purpose of CERCLA); see Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012).
16 J.V. Peters & Co. v. Adm’r, EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 1985) (“[CERCLA]’s primary purpose
is ‘the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites’ . . . .” (quoting Walls v. Waste Res. Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318
(6th Cir. 1985))); Superfund: CERCLA Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/
superfund-cercla-overview (last visited Jan. 31, 2016) (stating that CERCLA authorizes the EPA to respond
“to releases . . . of hazardous substances that may endanger public health or the environment”).
17 See OFFICE OF SITE REMEDIATION ENF’T, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2273G, OVERVIEW OF ABILITY
TO PAY GUIDANCE AND MODELS (1995) [hereinafter EPA OVERVIEW OF ABILITY TO PAY].
18 1 COLLIER REAL ESTATE, supra note 15.
19 Id.
20 See EPA OVERVIEW OF ABILITY TO PAY, supra note 17.
21 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-658, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES: EPA SHOULD
DO MORE TO ENSURE THAT LIABLE PARTIES MEET THEIR CLEANUP OBLIGATIONS (2005) (stating that smaller
Superfund cleanups averaged around $12 million per cleanup in 2005).
22 1 COLLIER REAL ESTATE, supra note 15, at ¶ 6.07[4].
15
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dischargeable.23 For example, in Ohio v. Kovacs, the Court held that an
affirmative cleanup obligation that gives rise to a right to payment is
“alternative to requiring” the debtor to undertake corrective action.24 The costs
associated with cleaning up the property are essentially the same as any other
obligation to pay, and, as a result, are dischargeable.
Whether cleanup orders themselves are dischargeable is less clear. In In re
Torwico Electronics, Inc., the Third Circuit reiterated the Supreme Court’s
proposition that the parties in possession of the contaminated property are the
parties who “‘must comply with the environmental laws of the State’ and
cannot ‘refuse to remove’ hazardous wastes.”25 Furthermore, the cleanupdemanding injunction is a nondischargeable claim, and a party cannot shirk its
responsibility once the government has determined liability.26 The court also
held that Torwico, as the producer of the hazardous waste, had an ongoing
responsibility for cleaning up the hazardous waste even though it no longer
possessed the property.27 As the responsible party, the polluter has a duty to
comply.
The Second Circuit has also found that a cleanup order does not constitute
a claim.28 In In re Chateugay Corp., the court held that any order to ameliorate
current pollution is “not a dischargeable claim.”29 Additionally, if the
government bears that cost, the funds used count as administrative claims and
are granted priority.30 The court found “that expenses to remove the threat
posed by such [hazardous] substances are necessary to preserve the estate,”
and are thus awarded administrative priority in creditor payment.31

23 See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 283 (1985) (stating that an affirmative cleanup obligation does give
rise to a right of payment, but when that right to payment is a prepetition debt, it is dischargeable).
24 Id. at 281 (“The State was seeking no more than a money judgment as an alternative to requiring [the
debtor] personally to perform the obligations imposed by the injunction.”).
25 Torwico Elecs., Inc. v. N.J., Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (In re Torwico Elecs., Inc.), 8 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir.
1993) (quoting Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 284–85).
26 See id. at 149–50 (stating that an administrative order demanding clean up does not constitute a claim
and is nondischargeable).
27 Id. at 151.
28 See United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1008 (2d Cir. 1991).
29 Id.
30 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (2012).
31 In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1010.
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B. Bankruptcy, Abandonment, and Midlantic
There is an inherent tension between bankruptcy law and environmental
law.32 The Bankruptcy Code provides two objectives: “1) to provide the debtor
with a fresh start financially, and 2) to provide the creditor with a mechanism
for the orderly distribution of the debtor’s estate.”33 Environmental laws exist
to protect public health and the environment.34 Courts have had a difficult time
determining how to enforce environmental laws while still providing the
debtor with a fresh start.35
1. Section 554: Abandonment in the Bankruptcy Code
One way that clean up liability is passed back and forth is through trustee
abandonment.36 Under § 554 of the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee is permitted to
abandon nonexempt property of the estate if it “is burdensome to the estate or
that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.”37 Environmentally
contaminated property is obviously a burden to the estate to pay for cleanup,38
and it could be considered of inconsequential value because of the minimal
property value that immediate liquidation would yield.
Abandonment is a crucial issue because it determines who will pay for
cleanup of the contaminated property: the government or the trustee and
creditors. “[I]f the trustee is permitted to abandon property before complying
with clean-up obligations, the burden of clean-up falls upon the government
unless joint and several liability enables pursuit of a solvent [Potentially

32

See Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 2, at 333.
Losch, Note, supra note 11, at 142 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 174, reprinted in
1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 5963, 6135).
34 See Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 2, at 334 (citing CMC Heartland Partners v. Union Pac. R.R. (In
re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co.), 3 F.3d 200, 201 (7th Cir. 1993)).
35 Kathryn R. Heidt, Environmental Obligations in Bankruptcy: A Fundamental Framework, 44 FLA. L.
REV. 153, 155 (1992) (“Either the United States Supreme Court or the United States Congress must resolve
definitively the issue of the proper status of environmental claims in bankruptcy proceedings.”); Hillinger &
Hillinger, supra note 2, at 333 (citing Debra L. Baker, Bankruptcy: The Last Environmental Loophole?, 34 S.
TEX. L. REV. 379, 404 (1993) (arguing Congress must set forth correct application and enforcement of
environmental laws); David W. Marston, Jr., In re Reading Co.: Cutting off Environmental Claims that Never
Existed During Bankruptcy, 43 VILL. L. REV. 637, 639 n.9 (1998) (“The United States Supreme Court has not
ruled on the precise issue of when a CERCLA claim arises for bankruptcy purposes . . . .”)).
36 See Losch, Note, supra note 11, at 145.
37 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2012); e.g., Mary J. Koks & Tim Million, Environmental Issues in Bankruptcy, 40
TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 43, 58–59 (2009–10).
38 See In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 284 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (finding that hazardous
waste was undisputedly burdensome to the estate); Koks & Million, supra note 37, at 58.
33
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Responsible Party].”39 Creditors who fund environmentally irresponsible
activity may constitute Potentially Responsible Parties under CERCLA.40 If a
trustee is not permitted to abandon the property, then the estate will have to
cover the expenses of cleanup. “[D]enial of abandonment requires the trustee
to expend estate funds on the maintenance of essentially worthless property.”41
If the trustee is required to expend these estate funds, this ultimately results in
a lower payout to both the trustee and the creditors. The governing case on
trustee abandonment is the Midlantic decision.42
2. Midlantic Decision
Midlantic is the only Supreme Court case regarding trustee abandonment of
environmentally contaminated property.43 Quanta Resources Corporation
stored a large amount of waste oil contaminated with a toxic carcinogen on its
property in New Jersey.44 Quanta owed Midlantic National Bank, a secured
creditor, approximately $600,000.45 The New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”) discovered that Quanta had violated a
state environmental statute by storing the large quantity of carcinogenic oil on
its property, and Quanta and NJDEP began negotiating the site’s cleanup.46
Soon after, Quanta filed for chapter 11 reorganization.47
“NJDEP issued a [post petition] administrative order requiring Quanta to
clean up the site.”48 Quanta failed to comply with the administrative order, its
financial state continued to deteriorate, and the reorganization was converted to
a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding.49 The court appointed a trustee who then
moved to abandon the facility’s real property because “the estimated cost of
disposing the waste oil plainly rendered the property a net burden to the
estate.”50 The bankruptcy court approved the abandonment “over NJDEP’s
39

Losch, Note, supra note 11, at 145 (demonstrating that liability returns to an insolvent debtor who is
likely unable to pay cleanup costs, resulting in the government paying unless a solvent Potentially Responsible
Party can be identified).
40 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012).
41 Losch, Note, supra note 11, at 145.
42 474 U.S. 494 (1986); see Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 2, at 361.
43 474 U.S. 494; see Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 2, at 361.
44 Midlantic Nat’l Bank, 474 U.S. at 496–97.
45 Id. at 497.
46 Id.
47 See id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
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objection that the estate had sufficient funds to protect the public from the
dangers posed by the hazardous waste.”51 NJDEP was unhappy with the
outcome and appealed the decision because it would force the state
government to fund the cleanup.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Looking to legislative history for
both the Bankruptcy Code and environmental laws, the Court stated that
Congress would have clearly expressed its desire “to grant the trustee an
extraordinary exemption from nonbankruptcy law,” rather than allowing one to
be inferred.52 It follows that the Court determined “that Congress did not
intend for § 554(a) to pre-empt all state and local laws.”53 The Court held “that
a trustee may not abandon property in contravention of a state statute or
regulation that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety
from identified hazards.”54 As a result, the trustee was not permitted to
abandon the property because of the state environmental law violations.55
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent took a definitively opposite approach to
determining whether the trustee can abandon contaminate property. Justice
Rehnquist stated, “Congress’ [sic] failure to so qualify § 554 indicates that it
intended the relevant inquiry at an abandonment hearing to be limited to
whether the property is burdensome and of inconsequential value to the
estate.”56 Finding that the legislative history showed that Congress did not
“intend[] to limit the trustee’s authority to abandon the burdensome
property,”57 Justice Rehnquist also agreed with the bankruptcy court that “[t]he
City and State are in a better position in every respect than either the Trustee or
debtor’s creditors to do what needs to be done to protect the public against the
dangers posed by” contaminated property.58 Governments tend to hold more
funds, potentially resulting in a quicker, safer cleanup.
However, Justice Rehnquist’s dissent criticizes the Court for failing to
appreciate that “interest in these cases lies not just in protecting public health

51

Id. at 498–99.
Id. at 501 (“[T]he intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from
disputable considerations of convenience in administering the estate of the bankrupt.” (quoting Swarts v.
Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904))).
53 Id. at 506.
54 Id. at 507.
55 See id.
56 Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 510.
58 Id. at 515.
52
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and safety but also in protecting the public fisc.”59 Abandonment would
ultimately result in the government footing the bill. As a conservative Justice,
Justice Rehnquist was interested in limiting the burden placed on taxpayers and
government resources. Other courts have listed the dissent’s factors in their
reasons for determining whether abandonment is proper.
Following Midlantic, courts seem to be at a loss for determining when
abandonment should be considered proper.60 It seems as if each court has its
own rules for what constitutes proper conditions for abandoning
environmentally contaminated property.61
C. The Innocent Landowner Defense
“The 1986 amendments to CERCLA added a new defense for innocent
landowners,” who had no knowledge or control over property contamination.62
Section 101(35) provides liability protection to landowners who “acquire
property without knowing of any contamination at the site and without reason
to know of any contamination at the site.”63 The provision transfers
landowners’ liability by not holding them responsible for cleaning up the site.64
Congress’s goal was “to protect purchasers that make ‘all appropriate inquiry’
into environmental conditions during the transaction to purchase the subject
real property,”65 as well as “those who acquire property by inheritance or
bequest.”66
59 Id. at 516. Justice Rehnquist “lead a conservative revolution on the Supreme Court during 19 years as
chief justice of the United States.” Linda Greenhouse, William H. Rehnquist, Architect of Conservative Court,
Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/05/politics/politicsspecial1/williamh-rehnquist-architect-of-conservative-court-dies-at-80.html?_r=0.
60 See Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987); In re
Stevens, 68 B.R. 774 (D. Me. 1987). But see Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Bus. Credit (In re Smith-Douglass,
Inc.), 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986). See
generally Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 2, at 361 (calling the Midlantic holding “elastic” because of
multiple resulting interpretations).
61 See Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 2, at 363–71 (containing a non-exhaustive yet thorough list of
cases concerning trustee abandonment).
62 ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 885 (Vicki Been et
al. eds., 6th ed. 2011).
63 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-962, at 186–87 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,
3279–80.
64 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(D)(ii)(II)(bb)(BB) (2012).
65 Rosemary J. Beless, Superfund’s “Innocent Landowner” Defense: Guilty Until Proven Innocent, 17 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 247, 252 (1997) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 99-962, at 3–5 (1986) (Conf. Rep.),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 3276–80).
66 Sudhir Lay Burgaard, Landowner Defenses to CERCLA Liability, A.B.A. YOUNG L. DIVISION 1
(2012),
http://www.mpplaw.com/files/Publication/ad96f94c-8eba-45d5-ab08-09afedc96605/Presentation/
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To assert the innocent landowner defense, the landowner must show six
factors:67
1) The landowner acquired property after all hazardous
substances were disposed of at the facility[;]
2) On or before the acquisition date, the landowner conducted
all appropriate inquiries, as described below, into the
previous ownership and uses of the facility consistent with
good commercial or customary standards and practices;
3) The landowner did not know, and had no reason to know, of
the hazardous substance contamination at the time of
purchase;
4) The landowner exercised due care with respect to the
hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration
the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of
all relevant facts and circumstances;
5) The landowner complied with all continuing obligations
after acquiring the property, as described below; and
6) The landowner took adequate precautions, meaning it took
affirmative acts, against foreseeable acts or omissions of any
such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably
result from such acts or omissions.68

The innocent landowner defense matters because it determines whether the
party in possession pays for the cleanup of the property. The defense
“authorizes the government and innocent private parties to recover all response
costs” from the responsible contaminating parties.69 If a trustee were able to
pass liability back to the debtor, the estate would no longer be liable for
cleanup costs of the hazardous contamination but would maintain title to the
property.
D. The Secured Creditor Exemption Under CERCLA
CERCLA includes an exemption from liability for “innocent” secured
creditors. The Act excludes a “person, who, without participating in the
management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to
PublicationAttachment/172c25e7-4019-4023-b0db-0aa94c28ec97/Landowner-Defenses-to-CERCLALiability.pdf.
67 Id. at 1–2.
68 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35), 9607(b)(3)).
69 Containerport Grp., Inc. v. Am. Fin. Grp., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 470, 474 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (“CERCLA
[allows for] private parties who have incurred response costs in connection with the clean-up of a hazardous
waste site [to] recover all, or some, of their costs.”).
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protect his security interest” from the definition of a potentially liable “owner
or operator.”70 Primary concerns involving bankruptcy and this exemption
include foreclosure and CERCLA liability as a secured creditor.71 The secured
creditor exemption
suggests that provided a secured creditor does not become overly
entangled in the affairs of the actual owner or operator of a facility,
the creditor may not be held liable for cleanup costs. The difficulty
arises, of course, in determining how far a secured creditor may go in
protecting its financial interests before it can be said to have acted as
an owner or operator within the meaning of the statute.72

Congress amended CERCLA in 1996 to clarify the provision outlining
lender liability. Congress added subparagraph (F) to CERCLA § 101(20),
which defined the term “participate in management.”73 The new provision
excluded “merely having the capacity to influence, or the unexercised right to
control, vessel or facility operations,” requiring “actually participating in the
management or operational affairs of a vessel or facility” in order to lose one’s
exemption.74 This addition providing for creditors who foreclose during a
bankruptcy proceeding.
II. ANALYSIS
This Section discusses four potential solutions to the current trustee
abandonment system. The first subsection explores the innocent landowner
defense and its potential relation to trustee abandonment. The next two
subsections discuss potential amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, with the
first adding a superlien provision, and the second developing an “abandonment
test” to be used in environmental contamination cases. The final subsection
creates a potential balancing test the Court could implement using factors from
other abandonment cases.

70

42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
See OFFICE OF ENF’T & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CERCLA LENDER
LIABILITY EXEMPTION: UPDATED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 2, 4 (2007).
72 United States v. Mirabile, [1985] 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20,994, at 20,995 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
4, 1985) (discussing what constitutes operator liability under CERCLA).
73 1 COLLIER REAL ESTATE, supra note 15, at ¶ 6.07[3].
74 Id. at ¶ 6.07[1] (citing 42 U.S.C. § 101(2)(F)(I), (II)).
71
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A. The Innocent Landowner Defense
1. Introduction
As previously discussed, CERCLA imposes joint and several liability upon
land holders, both the initial polluters and subsequent possessors.75 There is a
very limited number of affirmative defenses a party can raise to avoid this
liability. One such defense is the innocent landowner defense.
The basic concept behind the innocent landowner defense is that a party
who is not responsible for environmental contamination should not bear the
brunt of cleanup costs.76 If a defendant is not the actor (or omitter) who caused
the contamination and resulting damage, then the defendant can avoid liability
under CERCLA. CERCLA states “[t]here shall be no liability . . . for a person
otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting
therefrom were caused solely by an act or omission of a third party other than
an employee or agent of the defendant.”77
While the innocent landowner defense may seem straightforward,
CERCLA lays out two factors that the defendant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence.78 First, the defendant must show that he or she
“exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking
into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of
all relevant facts and circumstances.”79 Second, the defendant is required to
show that he or she “took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of
any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from
such acts or omissions.”80
The EPA addressed the innocent landowner defense in a 1989 guidance
document.81 The document lays out four threshold questions for determining
whether the innocent landowner defense even applies to the situation:
75 See John R. Jacus & Dean C. Miller, Coming Full CERCLA: An Update on Superfund Developments,
7 ENVTL. LIABILITY 1 (1999).
76 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
77 Id.
78 See id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See Guidance on Landowner Liability under Section 107(a)(1) of CERCLA, De Minimis Settlements
under Section 122(g)(1)(B) of CERCLA, and Settlements with Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated
Property, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235 (June 6, 1989).
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1) Did the Landowner acquire the property without knowledge
or reason to know of the disposal of hazardous substances?
....
2) Did Governmental landowners acquire the property
involuntarily or through eminent domain proceedings?
....
3) Did the Landowner acquire the property by inheritance or
bequest without knowledge?
....
4) Was the property contaminated by third parties outside the
chain of title? 82

While a party raising the defense need not answer all four questions, courts
look to these questions to determine if a party can meet the qualifying criteria
necessary to raise the defense.
The actual application of the innocent landowner defense is fairly rare.83 In
only a few cases has a court, “found that a landowner met those innocent
owner requirements.”84 It is difficult to shirk liability, but when courts allow it,
they generally permit the innocent owner to seek full cost recovery rather than
a right of contribution.85
2. The Trustee as an Innocent Landowner
In the event that a trustee wishes to abandon environmentally contaminated
property, a court could look to either CERCLA or the Bankruptcy Code to
determine whether the trustee is a responsible polluter who should bear the
brunt of cleanup costs. Trustee possession and maintenance of property is
seemingly analogous to the innocent landowner who takes possession of
previously contaminated (or soon to be contaminated) real property.
Courts have gone so far as to compare government acquisition of land to
the inheritance of contaminated property, applying the innocent landowner
defense to the acting agency.86 In Petersen Sand & Gravel, the Lake County

82

Id.
See Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, Innocent Owner Status Under Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 12 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 161 (2006).
84 Id.
85 See id.
86 See City of Emeryville v. Elementis Pigments, Inc., 52 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1648 (N.D. Cal. 2001);
United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Ill. 1992). But see City of Toledo v.
Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1013 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (holding that the city could not assert
83
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Forest Preserve District (“Forest Preserve”) condemned Petersen Sand &
Gravel’s property so that it could be used as a recreational lake.87 “While
working on the site, a Forest Preserve bulldozer struck a buried barrel” of
hazardous waste, resulting in a release onto the property.88 As a result, the EPA
performed a remedial investigation of the site and sought recovery under
CERCLA.89 The United States sued the Petersen Sand & Gravel, who then
sued Forest Preserve for recovery resulting from the CERCLA action.90 Forest
Preserve raised the innocent landowner defense, stating “that it had no direct or
indirect contractual relationship with any third party who caused a release”91
The court found that CERCLA requires absence of knowledge only when “the
defendant is a government entity that acquired [the property] through
involuntary transfer.”92
This process is analogous to a chapter 7 trustee taking control of
contaminated property. When a chapter 7 case is filed or converted from a
chapter 11, all of the debtor’s nonexempt property becomes its own entity as
an estate.93 A chapter 7 trustee in bankruptcy is an official appointed by the
U.S. Trustee (or bankruptcy court in Alabama and North Carolina) whose duty
is to administer the estate and liquidate the debtor’s assets so that creditors can
be repaid.94 The trustee’s acquisition of the estate in a chapter 7 conversion is
similar to the Forest Preserve’s acquisition of Petersen Sand & Gravel’s
property in the case described above because the acquisition took place
through involuntary transfer by a government entity.95
Additionally, the process of acquisition and liquidation under chapter 7
bankruptcy and foreclosure is similar. A trustee is like a secured lender who
takes control of contaminated property. If that lender was not aware of the
contamination upon acquisition, then the lender should not be liable under

itself as an innocent owner because it had not adhered to the proper eminent domain process in purchasing the
property).
87 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1348 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
88 Id.
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988)).
92 Id. at 1357 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)).
93 See Chapter 7–Bankruptcy Basics, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Feb. 4, 2016).
94 Id.
95 Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1357 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)).

ARWOOD GALLEYSPROOFS

2016]

5/11/2016 11:21 AM

TRUST(EE) AND ABANDONMENT ISSUES

379

CERCLA.96 Similarly, a chapter 7 trustee takes control of managing
contaminated property without any prior participation in the management of
the property.97 This ability to shirk liability through the innocent landowner
defense should apply to the estate as a result.
Courts have commonly held that inheritance of contaminated property
allows parties to raise the innocent landowner defense.98 In United States v.
150 Acres of Land, the Bohaty family inherited land that had been used in a
farm-equipment repair business.99 In 1987, a “local fire department noticed
numerous fifty-five gallon drums on the property and notified the Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency (“OEPA”).”100 The OEPA notified the
federal EPA, who took soil samples and determined that the substances found
inside the drums had discharged into the property’s soil.101 The Bohaty family
was unaware of the drums’ contents’ release, much less their existence on the
property.102 The court found that it could legitimately review the inherited
interests under the innocent landowner defense because the interests were
acquired after disposal.103
A chapter 7 trustee’s acquisition of property is similar to an inheriting party
in several ways. Just like an inheriting party, the trustee has no determination
over whether he or she will take control of a contaminated parcel.104 This
meets the requirement of innocent landowners who have inherited
contaminated property. For the defense to apply, these landowners must have
not contributed to the disposal or release of pollutants onto the property.105 If a
96 See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F.
Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989); United States v. Md. Bank & Tr. Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986)).
97 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK FOR CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEES 2–4 (2012) (demonstrating that a
trustee in bankruptcy has no control over which case he or she has been assigned because “[t]he United States
Trustee appoints panel members to chapter 7 cases on a fair and equitable basis by utilizing a blind rotation
system”).
98 See United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2000); Illinois v. Grigoleit Co., 104 F.
Supp. 2d 967 (C.D. Ill. 2000); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shulimson Bros. Co., 1 F. Supp. 2d 553 (W.D.N.C. 1998);
see also Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Va. 1993)
(not explicitly deciding on the innocent landowner defense, ruling that a person should be subjected to
CERCLA liability merely because property had been inherited).
99 See 204 F.3d at 700–01.
100 Id. at 701.
101 See id.
102 See id.
103 See id. at 706–07.
104 See HANDBOOK FOR CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEES, supra note 97, at 2–4 (demonstrating that a trustee in
bankruptcy has no control over which case he or she has been assigned because “[t]he United States Trustee
appoints panel members to chapter 7 cases on a fair and equitable basis by utilizing a blind rotation system”).
105 See United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 705 (6th Cir. 2000).
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trustee is actively doing his or her duty to control and preserve estate property,
then the trustee should “take reasonable steps to abate or prevent
environmental contamination by or to estate property.”106 The trustee’s
position could be construed as analogous to an innocent inheritor.107
While courts have held that prior knowledge of hazardous substances does
not always preclude the innocent landowner defense,108 courts generally
preclude the innocent landowner defense when a party had prior knowledge of
hazardous substances on the property at the time of acquisition.109 While a
chapter 7 trustee may have prior knowledge of the contamination of the
property upon assuming responsibility for the estate, this is unlikely given the
blind assignment process governed by the U.S. Trustee.110
3. Trustee Asserting the Innocent Landowner Defense
Given the discussion above, a chapter 7 trustee may be able to assert the
innocent landowner defense. The trustee could be considered a government
entity taking involuntary control of estate property, which is also similar to
inheritance. It is against the trustee’s duty to contribute to contamination.
Additionally, if the trustee is blindly assigned a case, then the trustee cannot
conduct due diligence prior to acquisition of the property. Although no chapter

106

HANDBOOK FOR CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEES, supra note 97, at 4–7.
See generally Soo Line R.R. Co. v. B.J. Carney & Co., 797 F. Supp. 1472, 1484 (D. Minn. 1992)
(finding that inherited property is not automatically excluded from CERCLA liability; rather, the inheritor has
to show “that 1) the release of hazardous substances was caused solely by a third party; 2) he exercised due
care with respect to the hazardous substance; and 3) he took precautions against foreseeable acts caused by the
third party and the consequences that would result from those acts”).
108 See Thomson Precision Ball Co. v. PSB Assocs. Liquidating Tr., 51 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1990 (D.
Conn. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (2000)) (“The defense requires not lack of knowledge or
reason to know of any hazardous substance, but rather of any hazardous substance that is the subject of the
release or threatened release.”).
109 See City of Wichita v. Tr. of APCO Oil Corp. Liquidating Tr., 306 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1052 (D. Kan.
2003) (denying the innocent landowner defense because the city knew of contamination before purchasing the
property); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 157 F. Supp. 2d 849, 858 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (denying the innocent
landowner defense because property was acquired knowing that it was contaminated); United States v.
Monsanto Co., 182 F. Supp. 2d 385, 409 (D.N.J. 2000) (“[A Landowner] cannot claim ignorance in the face
of . . . evidence [of knowledge of waste materials], even if he did not know that the materials contained
hazardous substances at the time.”); New York v. DelMonte, No. 98-CV-0649E(M), 2000 WL 432838, at *4
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2000) (“One cannot be an ‘innocent landowner’ under CERCLA if, after learning of the
contamination, he fails to take ‘precautions to prevent the “threat of release” or other foreseeable consequences
arising from the pollution on the site.’” (quoting Kerr-McGee Chem. v. Lefton Iron & Metal, 14 F.3d 321, 325
(7th Cir. 1994))).
110 See HANDBOOK FOR CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEES, supra note 97.
107
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7 trustee has asserted the innocent landowner defense, it appears that the
trustee would be a prime candidate for the innocent landowner defense.
The trustee would gain a financial advantage by asserting the innocent
landowner defense rather than abandoning the contaminated property. When a
trustee abandons property, the title “revests . . . retroactively to the date of
commencement of the case.”111 Because the title revests, the debtor once again
has control the property. While this is advantageous for the estate because it
does not have to fund the cleanup, the estate also loses the value of the
contaminated property once it has been cleaned up. Conversely, if the trustee
asserts the innocent landowner defense, the estate will still not bear the brunt
of the cleanup costs and would maintain title to the ameliorated property. The
ability to liquidate this property adds value to the estate, resulting in greater
repayment of the creditors.
4. Potential Amendments to CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code
At this point in time, no trustee has asserted the innocent landowner
defense in regards to environmentally contaminated property. While a trustee
could raise the innocent landowner defense under the current law,
modifications to either CERCLA or the Bankruptcy Code would make it easier
to raise the defense. A new provision could include several important factors.
Obviously, the new provision would have to include an allowance of the
use of the innocent landowner defense by a chapter 7 trustee in bankruptcy.
For example, an amendment to CERCLA could either redefine “government
entity” to include the term “which acquired the facility by escheat, or through
any other involuntary transfer or acquisition,” including acquisition of an estate
in bankruptcy by a chapter 7 trustee.112 This would allow the trustee to raise
the innocent landowner defense113 in a situation involving a contaminated
estate that may not be eligible for abandonment.
An amendment to the Bankruptcy Code could be placed in either the trustee
abandonment section114 or the defenses of the estate section.115 As an addition
111 In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 948 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) (citing LaRoche v. Tarpley (In
re Tarpley), 4 B.R. 145, 146 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980)).
112 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(ii) (2012).
113 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(iii) (“In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish
that the defendant has satisfied the requirements of section [9607](b)(3)(a) and (b) . . . .”).
114 11 U.S.C. § 554 (2012).
115 11 U.S.C. § 558.
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to “[a]bandonment of property of the estate,”116 the Code could provide for the
ability of the estate to retain title to the property but remove liability for costs
of cleanup of environmentally contaminated property. As an addition to
“[d]efenses of the estate,”117 the amendment could provide that “[t]he estate
shall have the benefit of any defense available to the debtor as against any
entity other than the estate, including statutes of limitation, statutes of frauds,
usury, . . . other personal defenses[, and affirmative defenses under
CERCLA].”118 This would guarantee the estate’s ability to raise the innocent
landowner defense, granted that all requirements of 11 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A)
and 9607(b)(3) are met.
Amendments to the statutes would need to discuss from whom state and
federal governments could collect cleanup costs. CERCLA’s objective “is to
place ultimate responsibility for the costs of cleaning up Superfund sites on
those who contributed to the problem.”119 If the estate is no longer liable for
the contamination, then the parties who would be liable are the debtor and
creditors who constitute “potentially responsible parties” (“PRPs”).120 Secured
creditors can already be held liable under a CERCLA cleanup action for
“participation in the management of the [borrower’s] facility.”121 If a creditor
becomes overly involved in the processes of the facility, then that creditor can
be slapped with a reimbursement charge or administrative order from the
government.122 Because bankruptcy is involved in this instance, the amended
provision could provide that the government’s reimbursement come directly
from the creditor’s share of the liquidated estate. This would guarantee that the
estate’s cleanup is directly tied to the ability to decontaminate and sell the site.

116

11 U.S.C. § 554.
11 U.S.C. § 558.
118 Id.
119 See EPA OSWER GUIDANCE, supra note 10.
120 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012) (laying out the criteria for potentially responsible parties).
121 1 COLLIER REAL ESTATE, supra note 15, at ¶ 6.07[2] (quoting Z & Z Leasing v. Graying Reel, Inc.,
873 F. Supp. 51, 55 (E.D. Mich. 1995)).
122 See Matthew H. Ahrens & David S. Langer, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: Environmental Risks
for Lenders Under Superfund: A Refresher for the Economic Downturn, 3 BLOOMBERG CORP. L.J 482, 487–89
(2008); Bruce C. Smith, The EPA’s New Lender Liability Rule: Quelling the Fear Spawned by Fleet Factors,
MORRIS, MANNING, & MARTIN, LLP, http://www.mmmlaw.com/media/the-epas-new-lender-liability-rulequelling-the-fear-spawned-by-fleet-factors/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2016); Robert W. Whetzel & Todd A. Coomes,
Commercial Real Estate Loans: Lender’s Environmental Liability, PRACTICAL LAW (2013),
http://www.rlf.com/files/6992_Commercial%20Real%20Estate%20Loans%20Lenders%20Environmental%20
Liability%20(3-520-7824).pdf.
117
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While collection from the debtor may seem worthless because the debtor is
in the middle of a bankruptcy proceeding, there are actually several
mechanisms for recovery. The EPA has long identified the inability to pay as a
“‘compelling public concern’ based on which an enforcement case may be
settled for less than the economic benefit of noncompliance.”123 Federal and
state governments do not have to receive full reimbursement from the debtor as
a result of noncompliance.124 Contamination cleanup recovery costs are
generally nondischargeable,125 but the amount can be negotiated based upon
the debtor’s ability to pay.126 Although there is current disagreement over the
time that CERCLA cleanup costs are actually incurred,127 this would be an
opportunity for Congress to add a uniform rule that determines whether these
cleanup costs are old debts, new debts, or administrative expenses for
preserving the estate.128 If a trustee asserted the innocent landowner defense,
he or she would want to argue that these costs are debts stemming from the
debtor’s and PRP creditors’ liability rather than administrative expenses so that
the government seeks reimbursement from the debtor and PRP creditors rather
than the estate. In this scenario, this is the best way a trustee could maximize
the value of estate property.129

123

EPA OVERVIEW OF ABILITY TO PAY, supra note 17.
But see id. (“EPA reserves the option, in appropriate circumstances, of seeking a penalty that might put
a company out of business . . . .”).
125 See United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1008 (2d Cir. 1991); see also
In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[J]ust as we were reluctant to
hold that WSDOT had a claim at the time of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance, we are
likewise reluctant to hold that a party becomes a known creditor upon the mere release or threatened release of
a hazardous substance.”); United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991)
(“The mere release of a hazardous substance prior to the confirmation of bankruptcy reorganization plan does
not give rise to a CERCLA claim which is discharged by that confirmation.”). But see In re Nat’l Gypsum Co.,
139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
126 See EPA OVERVIEW OF ABILITY TO PAY, supra note 17, at 2.
127 See Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 799 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating
that a CERCLA claim arises when response costs are incurred); Schweitzer v. Consol. Rail Corp. (Conrail),
758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1985) (ruling that asbestos exposure does not give rise to cause of action until injury is
discovered). But see Jensen v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs. (In re Jensen), 127 B.R. 27, 32 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1991) (“The claim arises based upon the debtor’s conduct.”).
128 See Borden, Inc., v. Wells-Fargo Bus. Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 856 F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir.
1988) (administrative expense); Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods.), 831 F.2d 118, 123
(6th Cir. 1987) (administrative expense); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 783 (D. Me. 1987) (administrative
expense). But see S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 143 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that cleanup
costs were not allowable as an administrative expense).
129 See 11 U.S.C. § 704 (2012); HANDBOOK FOR CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEES, supra note 97, at 4–6.
124
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5. Conclusion
Again, the innocent landowner defense is a potential alternative solution to
trustee abandonment. Rather than reverting title to the debtor, the estate would
maintain title. Liability would shift to the debtor and PRP creditors who could
then be sued by the government for reimbursement for cleanup charges. The
estate and creditors would benefit far more from this defense than
abandonment because the estate retains title, does not pay cleanup costs, and
liquidates the property once cleanup is complete. Conversely, under
abandonment, the title to the property revests to the debtor, and the estate no
longer gains any value from ownership. The innocent landowner defense
results in a bigger payout to the trustee and creditors, and the potentially
responsible parties end up paying, just as Congress intended when it passed
CERCLA.130 The primary concern one may have with the innocent landowner
defense is that the government ends up paying cleanup; that was the whole
reason Midlantic went to the Supreme Court—the state of New Jersey did not
want to pay for cleanup costs on its own.
B. Section 554 Abandonment
1. Introduction
The main concern arising from trustee abandonment of environmentally
contaminated property is that there is no hardline rule describing when
abandonment is proper. The Bankruptcy Code provides that “the trustee may
abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of
inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.”131 As previously discussed,
courts have failed to agree on what constitutes “burdensome” and
“inconsequential value” when it comes to environmental contamination.132
There are two straightforward solutions that could solve the inconsistencies: a
statutory proposal, or a court-created balancing test.

130 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9657 (2012); 1 COLLIER REAL ESTATE, supra note 15, at ¶ 6.07[1] (explaining
the basic purpose of CERCLA).
131 11 U.S.C. § 554(a).
132 See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. N. Am. Prods. Acquisition Corp., 137 B.R. 8, 12 (D.N.J. 1992)
(stating abandonment is permissible if it “will not aggravate the threat of harm to the health and safety of the
public or create some additional harm”); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 272 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986)
(imposing a five-part inquiry for abandonment); In re Okla. Ref. Co., 63 B.R. 562, 565 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1986) (“[A]bandonment will not aggravate the existing situation . . . .”); Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 2, at
366.
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2. Subsequent Case Law Highlighting Inconsistencies
Because Midlantic is the only Supreme Court case on this issue, and
because the opinion does not leave a straightforward analysis to determine
when abandonment is proper, courts are split on how to interpret when a
trustee can abandon property.133 Different courts have given weight to different
parts of the Midlantic opinion.
The majority of courts have given Midlantic a narrow interpretation.
“Several courts have interpreted Midlantic to prohibit abandonment only when
the property poses an imminent and identifiable harm to the public health or
safety.”134 The majority takes this interpretation from footnote nine of the
opinion.135 Other courts have allowed abandonment of contaminated property
despite imminent and identifiable public harm if there are no unencumbered
assets.136 Still, other courts have established conditions and multi-part tests for
determining whether abandonment is proper.137
133

Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 2, at 363.
Id. at 364 (citing N.M. Env’t Dep’t v. Foulston (In re L.F. Jennings Oil Co.), 4 F.3d 887, 890 (10th Cir.
1993) (despite oil contamination, there was no immediate threat to public health or safety because (1) site was
not listed on state contaminated site list and (2) state’s expert could not state positively if threat existed); In re
Anthony Ferrante & Sons, Inc., 119 B.R. 45, 50 (D.N.J. 1990) (despite bacterial contamination of public water
supply system, no imminent danger existed because public knew of danger and had means to protect itself); In
re Brio Ref., Inc., 86 B.R. 487, 489 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (holding trustee could abandon site listed on National
Priority List because no evidence showed imminent and identifiable risk to public); Huennekens v. Walker (In
re S. Int’l Co.), 165 B.R. 815, 823 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994) (stating that the “very fact” it took six weeks for
spill to occur proves the threat was not imminent); In re Sheffield Oil Co., 162 B.R. 339, 341 (Bankr. M.D.
Ala. 1993) (holding that the trustee was not required to spend estate funds to assess underground petroleum
tanks when no evidence of contamination existed); In re H.F. Radandt, Inc., 160 B.R. 323, 328 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1993) (inaction by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources was proof that problem was not
imminent); In re Doyle Lumber, Inc., 137 B.R. 197, 203 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1992) (finding lumber treatment
plant contaminated by chromium and arsenic to not be an imminent threat when (1) the plant complied with
state waste management regulations and (2) the only ground for objection was that the plant had not been
closed down); White v. Coon (In re Purco, Inc.), 76 B.R. 523, 533 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987) (finding no
evidence that drums of cut-back asphalt and thinners were hazardous, and even if they were, no evidence that
they presented risk of harm or threat to public safety)).
135 Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 507 n.9 (1986).
136 See Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Bus. Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 856 F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir.
1988) (permitting abandonment when estate had no unencumbered assets and site did not pose serious public
health or safety risk); In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 B.R. 912, 917 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989) (permitting
abandonment because (1) the estate did not possess enough unencumbered assets to fund cleanup and (2) there
was no evidence of imminent harm or danger to public); Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 2, at 365.
137 See N. Am. Prods. Acquisition Corp., 137 B.R. at 12 (finding abandonment permissible if it “will not
aggravate the threat of harm to the health and safety of the public or create some additional harm”); In re
Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. at 272 (imposing a five-part inquiry for abandonment); In re Okla. Ref. Co., 63
B.R. at 565 (“[A]bandonment will not aggravate the existing situation . . . .”); Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note
2, at 366–69.
134
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A minority of courts “have interpreted Midlantic to prohibit abandonment
if abandonment would violate a state statute or regulation designed to protect
public health or safety.”138 These courts rarely permit trustee abandonment,
which can leave trustees in a bind to liquidate the property and pay creditors.
3. Statutory Proposals to CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code
Statutory amendments aimed at solving the contravening goals of
bankruptcy and environmental law have been proposed for years, but they have
not gained a great deal of traction with the legislature.139 One of the most
promising of these statutory proposals is a “superlien.”140 The idea of a
superlien is that the government would pay for the contaminated property’s
cleanup and would be first in line for repayment upon liquidation of the
estate.141 A superlien would be given “priority as to other liens against the
contaminated property even if such other liens predate the state’s lien.”142 The
hope is that the superlien would “increase[] the chances that a state will recoup
its cleanup expenditures.”143
Multiple states have legislated environmental superliens for contamination
cleanups.144 When tested in court, these liens have generally been upheld and
138 Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 2, at 363 (citing Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal
Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 118, 122 (6th Cir. 1987) (discussing how trustee cannot abandon property when it would
result in economic health hazard); In re Unidigital, Inc., 262 B.R. 283, 286–90 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (finding
debtor’s landlord was not entitled to administrative expense for cleanup costs to remove a printer because (1)
the printer did not pose imminent identifiable harm and (2) the landlord did not specify any particular law that
abandonment would violate); In re Mahoney-Troast Constr. Co., 189 B.R. 57, 59 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995)
(holding that the landlord’s cleanup costs were not entitled to administrative expense priority because landlord
could not specify any state law requiring remediation of the contaminated property); In re Peerless Plating Co.,
70 B.R. 943, 946 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) (“[A] trustee may not abandon property in contravention of a state
statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from identified
hazards.”); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 780–81 (D. Me. 1987) (denying abandonment because the
contaminated waste oil threatened public safety and abandonment would contravene state law)). See In re ATP
Oil & Gas Corp., No. 12-36187, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2608 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 19, 2013) (denying
abandonment because it would result in a “derogation of public health and safety”).
139 See Dolly Hoffman & Jeffrey R. Seaman, A Pragmatic Solution to a Complex Dilemma: A
Fundamental Approach to Resolving the Conflict Between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code, 4 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 243, 243 (1996); Losch, Note, supra note 11, at 137.
140 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Environmental Superliens and the Problem of Mortgage-Backed
Securitization, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 127, 128 (2002); Losch, Note, supra note 11, at 167.
141 Losch, Note, supra note 11, at 167.
142 Nash, supra note 140.
143 See id. at 148–49, nn.80–81 (discussing the problem of large environmental cleanup costs, the state’s
inability to recoup its expenditures, and the economics surrounding the concept and practice of superliens).
144 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-452 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 13 (2016); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 (2015).
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have allowed states to recoup their expenses.145 However, because courts are
not permitted to write the law,146 some courts have recognized their inability to
create constructive superliens.147 A superlien must come through congressional
legislation to be enacted federal law.
A bill that would have amended CERCLA § 107(1) to “give priority claims
of governmental units pursuant to CERCLA . . . for costs incurred to respond
to hazards created by release of hazardous substances” failed in the House of
Representatives in 1983.148 Congress could again look to amending CERCLA
to provide a superlien on governmental cleanup in the case of chapter 7
bankruptcy.
The Bankruptcy Code is no stranger to prioritized lien repayment. For
example, § 507 lays out the order of priority claims, giving administrative
expense claims second priority.149 Similarly, when a trustee is authorized to
operate the debtor’s business, the trustee may be authorized to obtain
unsecured credit or incur unsecured debt for such operation.150 If that credit is
obtained in the “ordinary course of business,” then it is allowed as a
§ 503(b)(1) administrative expense.151 However, if the trustee is unable to
obtain unsecured credit as an administrative expense, the court can authorize
credit by giving the creditor’s claim “priority over any or all administrative
expenses of the kind specified in section 503(b) or 507(b).”152 While most
proposals regarding superliens have been directed towards CERCLA
amendments, amending the Bankruptcy Code is another possible solution.

145 See 229 Main St. Ltd. P’ship v. Massachusetts (In re 229 Main St. Ltd. P’ship), 251 B.R. 186, 190–91
(D. Mass. 2000) (“While the United States Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of the validity of
environmental superliens, two justices have indicated that superliens are a viable method for states to ensure
financing of cleanups.” (citing Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 515 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 286 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring))).
146 See generally Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench: A Definition and a Defense, 11 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 185 (2007).
147 See In re Paris Indus. Corp., 80 B.R. 2, 5 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987) (“[C]reation [of a superlien] would
push us far beyond the existing frontier established by reported cases and existing legislation.”); In re Stevens,
53 B.R. 783, 787 (D. Me. 1985) (finding that, even with the urging of the State of Maine, there was no legal
theory to find a “constructive statutory lien” regarding cleanup costs).
148 See H.R. 2767, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
149 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2012).
150 11 U.S.C. § 364(a).
151 Id.
152 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(1).
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Generally, cleanup by a state or federal agency is allowable as an
administrative expense under § 503(b)(1)(A).153 However, even with
administrative priority, the state may still be lower on the figurative recovery
totem pole than several parties.154 A potential alternative to awarding
administrative priority to these contamination cleanup claims is altering the
Bankruptcy Code to provide super-priority to these governmental bodies. Such
an amendment could fall within 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) as an additional
provision providing for governmental entities to collect contamination cleanup
claims first before any other administrative expenses.155 This language could
potentially be modeled off of existing state provisions. For example,
Connecticut’s superlien statute states that any amount paid to “contain and
remove or mitigate the effects of a spill or to remove any hazardous waste shall
be a lien against the real estate,” upon which the spill or hazardous waste was
located.156 The superlien takes precedence over all transfers and encumbrances
on the real property.157
The current language in the Bankruptcy Code granting priority in adequate
protection claims gives a creditor’s claim “priority over every other claim
allowable under such subsection.”158 An added provision could provide that a
lien resulting from a state or federal cleanup under CERCLA will be given
precedence over all other liens. Similarly, the language could be based upon
the House bill that failed in 1983.159 An added provision could provide that
claims of governmental units pursuant to CERCLA are given priority above all
other administrative expenses. These provisions would assist in repaying the
government.160

153 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (“necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate” are allowed
administrative expense claims); see In re Paris Indus. Corp., 80 B.R. 2, 3 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987) (citing
Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494 (1986); Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall
Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d
Cir. 1985); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774 (D. Me. 1987)).
154 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(1)(A), 507(a)(2).
155 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2).
156 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-452(a) (2015).
157 Id.
158 11 U.S.C. § 507(b).
159 See H.R. 2767, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
160 See Nash, supra note 140, at 158.
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A superlien could provide several benefits. A superlien would result in
greater repayment to the government for environmental cleanups.161 In
bankruptcy, this is similar to creating a senior lien under 11 U.S.C. § 364(d).162
Additionally, a superlien statute may “increase the likelihood that lenders
themselves undertake cleanups,” to prevent a loss of value in the property and
to prevent a senior lien from reducing creditors’ payment in bankruptcy.163
While there are benefits, there are certainly negative factors regarding
superliens. Courts have sometimes ruled against the idea of a superlien because
it takes away repayment from innocent creditors.164 Courts have also worried
about the retroactive effects of superliens.165 However, a secured creditor
knowingly “assume[s] a financial risk when it takes a security interest in
collateral.”166
Additionally, another statutory proposal could amend § 554 of the
Bankruptcy Code to account for environmentally contaminated property.167
The proposal would be similar to the means test168 in that it would establish a
series of determining factors. These factors could look to the amount of
liability held by the debtor, the amount of liability held by potentially
responsible creditors, the estimated amount of expenditure by the government
for cleanup costs, and the identifiable public health hazard resulting from a
slow cleanup. This Comment’s proposed amendment provides as § 554(a)(2):
In considering whether the granting abandonment is proper in regard to
environmentally contaminated property, the court shall look to the following
factors, followed by those listed above after careful consideration of how to

161 See David H. Topol, Hazardous Waste and Bankruptcy: Confronting the Unasked Questions, 13 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 185, 226 (1994) (superliens allow the government to displace secured creditors and “collect
significantly more money”).
162 11 U.S.C. § 364(d) (creating a senior or equal lien on property of the estate when a trustee obtains
credit for operating the debtor’s business).
163 Nash, supra note 140, at 158.
164 See In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 289–90 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (“E.P.A. holds
administrative expense claims against the estate. . . . [but other creditors] should not be expected to bear the
costs of these administrative expenses merely because the estate has insufficient assets.” (citing Gen. Elec.
Credit Corp. v. Levin & Weintraub (In re Flagstaff Foodserv. Corp.), 739 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1984); Brookfield
Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Borron, 738 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Korupp Assocs., Inc., 30 B.R. 659 (Bankr. D.
Me. 1983); In re Codesco, Inc., 18 B.R. 225 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982))).
165 See In re Paris Indus. Corp., 80 B.R. 2, 4 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987) (discussing the potential retroactive
effects of New York’s failed superlien bill).
166 In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. at 288.
167 11 U.S.C. § 554.
168 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A).
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weigh them. Rather than having fixed numbers like the means test,169 the
“abandonment test” could be more fluid. While this could still result in some
ambiguity, providing a list of dispositive enumerated factors would lead to
much firmer positions than the words “imminent and identifiable harm”
alone.170
4. Proposed Balancing Test
In contrast to amending CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme
Court could establish a balancing test to determine whether abandoning
environmentally contaminated property is proper. Courts have applied their
own standards to trustee abandonment cases. In In re St. Lawrence Corp., the
court articulated a four-part test to analyze the abandonment petition.171 The
court found that abandonment would be improper unless all four of the
following conditions are met:
1) an identified hazard exists that poses a risk of imminent and
identifiable harm to the public health and safety;
2) abandonment of the property will violate a state statute or
regulation;
3) the statute or regulation being violated is reasonably
designed to protect the public health and safety from
imminent and identifiable harm caused by identified
hazards; and
4) compliance with the statute or regulation would not be so
onerous as to interfere with the bankruptcy administration
itself.172

In In re Franklin Signal Corp., the court laid out a five-part inquiry for
abandonment: “(1) the imminence of danger to the public health and safety, (2)
the extent of probable harm, (3) the amount and type of hazardous waste, (4)
the cost to bring the property into compliance with environmental laws, and (5)
the amount and type of funds available for cleanup.”173 Similarly, in In re
Peerless Plating Co., the court developed a three-step presumption against
abandonment except when:

169
170
171
172
173

11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A).
See Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 507 n.9 (1986).
See 248 B.R. 734, 739 (D.N.J. 2000) (citing Midlantic Nat’l Bank, 474 U.S. at 506–07).
Id. (citing Midlantic Nat’l Bank, 474 U.S. at 506–07).
65 B.R. 268, 272 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
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1. the environmental law in question is so onerous as to interfere with the
bankruptcy adjudication itself; or
2. the environmental law in question is not reasonably designed to protect
the public health or safety from identified hazards; or
3. the violation caused by abandonment would merely be speculative or
indeterminate.174
Some significant overlap exists in the factors these courts use. Initially,
they all use the language quoted from footnote nine in Midlantic, stating that
the abandonment power should not be limited by regulations that are “not
reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and
identifiable harm.”175 If the Court were to fashion a balancing test, it seems
natural to start with the language included in the last decision concerning this
issue.176
The courts with multi-factor tests all look to the laws and regulations of
which the contaminated property is in violation to determine their
stringency.177 The underlying goal is to posit how serious violation of these
laws and regulations is.178 Should the Court fashion a balancing test, it would
be crucial to consider the seriousness of environmental laws and regulations
the debtor is violating.179 Courts have repeatedly held that abandonment is
proper when the debtor is in violation of environmental laws that are not
primarily driven by public health and safety.180

174 70 B.R. 943, 947 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987). The court also suggested that a potential fourth factor
could be “the environmental law in question is not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety
from imminent and identifiable harm.” Id. at 947 n.2.
175 474 U.S. at 507 n.9; see In re St. Lawrence Corp., 248 B.R. at 739; In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R.
at 947, 947 n.2; In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. at 272.
176 See Midlantic Nat’l Bank, 474 U.S. at 507 n.9.
177 In re St. Lawrence Corp. 248 B.R. at 739; In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. at 947; In re Franklin
Signal Corp., 65 B.R. at 272.
178 In re St. Lawrence Corp. 248 B.R. at 739; In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. at 947; In re Franklin
Signal Corp., 65 B.R. at 272.
179 See In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. at 273 (“Midlantic requires that the trustee . . . conduct an
investigation to determine what hazardous substances, if any, burden the property.”).
180 See Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Bus. Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988);
Huennekens v. Walker (In re S. Int’l Co.), 165 B.R. 815 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994); In re Sheffield Oil Co., 162
B.R. 339 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1993); In re H.F. Radandt, Inc., 160 B.R. 323 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1993); In re
Doyle Lumber, Inc., 137 B.R. 197 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1992); In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 B.R. 912
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989); In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R. 49 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989). But see Lancaster v. Tennessee
(In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987) (denying abandonment because it was in
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Each multi-factor test determines how much the cost of coming into
compliance would affect the rest of the bankruptcy proceeding.181 This would
be an excellent opportunity to “give . . . an example of what condition would
be so onerous as to interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself.”182 At this
time, it is important to note that depletion of the estate does not constitute such
an “onerous” condition.183
The most debatable factor the Court could consider in a multi-factor test is
taking cost into account to determine if abandonment is proper.184 On one
hand, cost should not be a factor when public health is at stake.185 On the other
hand, the state arguably has more resources to deal with a major environmental
hazard.186 CERCLA’s secured creditor exemption exists to protect creditors
who did not “participate in management” of the contaminated property,187 and
as a result, these secured creditors should not have to pay for the cost of
cleanup through a reduced payment.188 However, one could also argue that
§ 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code189 exists to preserve the estate, no matter the
cost that results to the secured creditors.190
If the Court agreed to hear another case regarding trustee abandonment of
environmentally contaminated property, it should use these factors to create a
balancing test. The Court could also create a hardline, single-factor rule
regarding abandonment. If the cost of compliance would result in minimal or
contravention of a state statute reasonably designed to protect public health); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774 (D.
Me. 1987) (denying abandonment because contaminated waste oil threatened public safety).
181 See Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 507 n.9 (1986); In re St.
Lawrence Corp., 248 B.R. at 739; In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. at 947; In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65
B.R. at 272.
182 In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. at 947.
183 See id.
184 See In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. at 274.
185 See Juniper Dev. Grp. v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transp., Inc.), 993 F.2d 915, 921 (1st Cir. 1993)
(finding “the expeditious cleanup of sites contaminated or threatened by hazardous substance releases which
jeopardize public health and safety” more important than response costs).
186 See Midlantic Nat’l Bank, 474 U.S. at 515 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
187 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2012).
188 See In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 289 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (“E.P.A. holds
administrative expense claims against the estate. . . . [but other creditors] should not be expected to bear the
costs of these administrative expenses merely because the estate has insufficient assets.”).
189 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (2012).
190 See In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 947 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) (“The normal course of
affairs in any [c]hapter 7 is to deplete the estate by liquidating it and distributing it to creditors as required by
law. The fact that one claimant or creditor receives the lion’s share does not render that claim onerous.”). But
see In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 274 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) (finding abandonment appropriate
because the approximate cost of cleanup would be twice as expensive as the estate’s unencumbered cash).
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no repayment to creditors other than the government, then abandonment is
proper for the purpose of repaying creditors.191 After all, that is one purpose of
bankruptcy.192
5. Conclusion
To create a more direct approach to abandonment, there are several
statutory proposals: amending CERCLA to include a “superlien” so that the
government can frontload contamination cleanup, and amending the
Bankruptcy Code to provide an abandonment test similar to the means test for
determining when abandonment is proper in cases of environmentally
contaminated property. Alternatively, the Court could revisit the issue and
clear up the confusion created by the Midlantic decision by fashioning a
balancing test or a hardline rule governing abandonment of environmentally
contaminated property.
CONCLUSION
Trustee abandonment of environmentally contaminated property matters
for several reasons. CERCLA cleanups are incredibly expensive, and
contaminated property poses a risk to public safety and health. Unfortunately,
neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has addressed this issue in quite some
time. This has led to a great deal of confusion, ambiguity, and a lack of
definitive rules in case law.193
CERCLA cleanups are incredibly expensive.194 Because these Superfund
cleanups are paid for out of tax revenue, the public has a vested interest in
minimizing the harm done to the public fisc, just as Justice Rehnquist pointed
191

See In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. at 274.
See Jonathan M. Hiltz, Note, Killing Two Birds with One Stone—The Proper (Non)Application of
Judicial Estoppel: Parker v. Wendy’s International, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2004), 30 DAYTON L. REV.
401, 411 (2005).
193 See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. N. Am. Prods. Acquisition Corp., 137 B.R. 8, 12 (D.N.J. 1992)
(“[A]bandonment [that] will not aggravate the threat of harm to the health and safety of the public or create
some additional harm should be permitted.”); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. at 277 (imposing a five-part
inquiry for abandonment); In re Okla. Ref. Co., 63 B.R. 562, 565 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986) (“[A]bandonment
will not aggravate the existing situation . . . .”).
194 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-287R, SUPERFUND: INFORMATION ON THE
NATURE AND COSTS OF CLEANUP ACTIVITIES AT THREE LANDFILLS IN THE GULF COAST REGION 2 (2011) (the
EPA’s expenditures at 511 different Superfund sites was $3.6 billion through the 2007 fiscal year); see also
GAO: EPA SHOULD DO MORE, supra note 21, at 8–9 (the largest 142 Superfund sites would average $140
million each in cleanup costs and smaller Superfund sites would average $12 million each in cleanup costs).
192
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out in his dissent in Midlantic.195 Some see allowing the government to pay for
numerous Superfund cleanups as irresponsible and harmful to the national and
state economies.196 After all, the primary reason NJDEP litigated in Midlantic
was to avoid paying out of pocket. Additionally, not requiring responsible
parties to ameliorate their messes seems to encourage noncompliance with
environmental laws. Rather than rewarding poor behavior, the Court should
prevent noncompliance or discourage such action. If a party is forced to pay
for its own cleanup, it follows that the party is less likely to engage in behavior
that would create that liability.
Many argue that the primary purpose of environmental laws is to protect
health rather than the property which those laws govern.197 Even though these
cleanups are expensive, they are necessary for protecting public health and
safety. While reaching compliance may be expensive, it warrants the question
of which outcome matters more: a healthy public and environment, or
preventing millions of dollars from being spent on contamination cleanup.
Additionally, we must figure out who must pay for cleanups: should we hold
individual parties responsible, or should deeper pockets pay when things go
awry?
Perhaps the most troubling problems resulting from this are the Supreme
Court’s failure to clarify its position in Midlantic and Congress’s failure to
amend either CERCLA or the Bankruptcy Code to account for this scenario.
Nearly three decades past the initial “punting” decision, the Supreme Court has
yet to grant certiorari over another § 554 environmental contamination case.
As a result, courts have implemented their own, unique rules for interpreting
Midlantic and determining when a trustee can abandon contaminated
property.198 The Supreme Court should clarify its last muddled quandary.
Since Midlantic, Congress has had multiple chances to amend or add
provisions that account for this, either under the Bankruptcy Code or

195

See 474 U.S. 494, 516 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See Timothy G. Wheeler, Toxic Waste Cleanup Sluggish Critics See Overhaul of ‘Superfund’ Law as
Expensive, Inefficient, BALT. SUN (May 19, 1996), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1996-05-19/news/
1996140003_1_uperfund-law-toxic-waste-federal-superfund-program, (discussing the length of time of
cleanups, the cost of cleanups, and their unpopularity).
197 See William Onzivu, International Environmental Law, the Public’s Health, and Domestic
Environmental Governance in Developing Countries, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 597, 600 (2006) (stating that
environmental protection and protection of public health are “mutually reinforcing” (citing Kevin R. Gray,
World Summit on Sustainable Development: Accomplishments and New Directions?, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
256, 256–57 (2003))).
198 Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 2, at 365.
196
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CERCLA. Congress has done neither, which discounts the importance of the
issue. Until one of these bodies acts, it will never be certain who will end up
paying cleanup costs: creditors or federal and state governments.
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